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Your Cervix is Showing: Loitering for 
Prostitution Policing as Gendered Stop & 
Frisk 
KATE MOGULESCU* 
This Article examines the problems inherent in policing 
under laws criminalizing loitering for the purpose of prosti-
tution (“LPP”).  LPP laws rely on dated notions of appear-
ance, gender expression, and sexual behavior that are 
weaponized against marginalized communities and individ-
uals. New York’s LPP law, enacted in 1976, has a rich his-
tory of discriminatory application on the basis of gender, 
race, class, and perceived sex worker status.   
 
 *  Assistant Professor of Clinical Law, Brooklyn Law School. From 2016 
through 2019, and for many years of preparation before that, I was part of the 
legal team that brought the constitutional challenge to New York’s Loitering for 
Prostitution law chronicled in this article. Although all sources cited and docu-
ments relied on here are part of the public record, reflecting on the case has reaf-
firmed my admiration for this indefatigable group of lawyers and the dedication 
and expertise of The Legal Aid Society and Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 
LLP.  I have particular gratitude to Jennifer Kroman for always being willing to 
walk into the fire with me. I also thank the Brooklyn Law School Summer Junior 
Faculty Workshop and Leigh Goodmark, my patron deity, for ideas and feedback. 
Most importantly, this Article recognizes the countless individuals the NYPD has 
targeted for arrest under the loitering law over the years, harassed and mis-
treated—individuals the courts disregard as a matter of course. True credit lies 
with the eight brave women who came forward in the litigation. They took the 
fight as far as humanly possible. As this Article shows, the outcome was disap-
pointing.  Yet, these plaintiffs persevered in demanding an inkling of reckoning 
in a system where the deck is unequivocally stacked against those arrested and 
prosecuted, particularly black and brown women. This Article honors their tenac-
ity and resilience.  
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A lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of New York’s 
LPP law and its enforcement by NYPD recently settled, lead-
ing to modest reforms in police procedure. This Article 
chronicles the effort to challenge the law, why that challenge 
fell short of its goal of eliminating harmful police practices, 
and the arrests that have continued to take place since the 
procedural reforms. Analyzing post-settlement LPP arrests 
where, for example, police allege as a basis for an arrest that 
an individual’s “cervix area” was exposed, despite the phys-
ical and anatomical impossibility of such exposure, this Ar-
ticle points out how LPP arrests escape scrutiny in the 
courts. 
Legal challenges fail to create adequate safeguards be-
cause LPP arrests are not ultimately about prostitution itself 
but instead reflect contestations over control of public space 
and women’s bodies. In the end, the law will not fix the prob-
lems intrinsic in LPP laws and policing. This is not an area 
where tinkering with existing law or practice suffices. Ra-
ther, to truly prevent baseless and unjust policing requires a 
more radical vision. This Article advocates for an abolition-
ist approach to the policing of prostitution, which includes 
the direct repeal of LPP statutes altogether, arguing that the 






PART I .............................................................................................74 
PART II............................................................................................85 




70 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW CAVEAT [Vol. 74:68 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Deponent states that at the above mentioned date, 
time and place of occurrence, he observed the de-
fendant . . . holding her cell phone to her ear while 
dancing and shaking her butt towards the street. 
Deponent further states that he observed that the de-
fendant was wearing a white shirt which was rolled 
up to her breast, exposing her stomach and spandex 
pants which were rolled down exposing her buttocks 
and cervix area. 
Deponent further states that he observed the defend-
ant walking up and down Roosevelt Avenue and ap-
proach approximately 5 or 6 single males, grab each 
male by the arm and engage them in a conversation.1 
Loitering laws that specifically criminalize being in public 
spaces for the purpose of engaging in prostitution have a rich history 
of discriminatory application on the basis of gender, race, class, and 
perceived sex worker status.2 Enactment and enforcement of loiter-
ing for prostitution laws are premised on dated and limiting notions 
of appearance, gender expression, and sexual behavior3 that are then 
weaponized against marginalized communities and individuals.4 
Yet, despite decades of American courts striking down vague crim-
inal loitering laws,5 prostitution loitering ordinances have survived,6 
 
 1 Criminal Court Complaint at 1–2, No. CR-041477-18QN (Crim. Ct. 
Queens Co., Dec. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Criminal Court Complaint, Dec. 12, 
2018] (on file with author) (emphasis added). 
 2 See Karen Struening, Walking While Wearing a Dress: Prostitution Loi-
tering Ordinances and the Policing of Christopher Street, 3 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & 
POL’Y 16, 16–20 (2016). 
 3 See id. at 29–30. 
 4 See Ginia Bellafante, Poor, Transgender and Dressed for Arrest, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/nyregion/poor-
transgender-and-dressed-for-arrest.html. 
 5 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 51, 64 (1999) (“[T]he 
ordinance enacted by the city of Chicago is unconstitutionally vague.”). 
 6 See, e.g., D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 70–73 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018) (“Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that section 240.37 is unconstitution-
ally vague.”). 
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even though they are just as pernicious in application as other laws 
deemed impermissibly vague. 
A paradigmatic example of such a law is New York State’s loi-
tering for the purpose of engaging in a prostitution offense 
(“LPP”)—Penal Law section 240.37.7 In 2019, a lawsuit challeng-
ing the constitutionality of Section 240.37, and its enforcement by 
the New York City Police Department (the “NYPD”), settled and 
led to only modest reforms in  police arrest procedures.8 Although 
unconstitutionally vague, courts sustain LPP laws because these 
laws sit at a distinct intersection of gender and the policing of public 
space. Factors that courts legitimize as objective, and therefore find 
to be safeguards,9 are impossibly and inextricably gendered, racial-
ized, and antiquated. Courts do not take issue with the kind of polic-
ing seen under LPP laws because heteronormative and misogynist 
reasoning insulates such policing from attack. 
This Article chronicles the effort to challenge section 240.37, 
and why it fell short of its goal of eliminating harmful and en-
trenched police practice. It further examines the arrests police con-
tinue to make even after procedural reforms. Post-settlement LPP 
arrests in New York include instances, such as the one quoted above, 
where the police use as a basis for an arrest that an individual’s “cer-
vix area” was exposed—despite this physical and anatomical impos-
sibility.10 The persistence of LPP laws, and attendant arrests, 
demonstrate the interplay between gender and petty offense enforce-
ment in ways that demand further consideration. Because LPP laws 
allow the policing of gender, appearance, and sexual behavior, LPP 
enforcement must be seen as gendered stop-and-frisk.11 
 
 7 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.37 (Consol. 2020). 
 8 See Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, D.H. v. City of New 
York, No. 16-cv-07698-PKC-KNF (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2019) [hereinafter D.H. 
Stipulation and Order of Dismissal]; see also Matt Tracy, NYPD Loosens Enforce-
ment of Loitering Law, GAY CITY NEWS (June 13, 2019), 
https://www.gaycitynews.nyc/stories/2019/13/loitering-law-enforcement-legal-
aid-suit-2019-06-13-gcn.html. 
 9 See, e.g., D.H., 309 F. Supp. 3d at 71–73. 
 10 See Criminal Court Complaint, Dec. 12, 2018, supra note 1, at 2. 
 11 Stop-and-frisk refers to police encounters on the street that allow a police 
officer to detain someone for questioning or conduct a physical frisk or pat-down 
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). See also People v. De Bour, 352 
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Part I of this Article looks at the litigation challenging New 
York’s LPP statute and the years of advocacy that preceded the case. 
By examining the types of arrests and prosecutions that continue 
even after extensive litigation, this Article looks critically at the set-
tlement of the litigation and the enforcement of the statute before, 
during, and after the settlement. LPP laws give the police unchecked 
discretion to use enforcement as a tool to serve myriad ends. This 
can result in arrests, for example, simply because someone has pre-
viously been arrested for sex work, arrests that further the investiga-
tion of unrelated or unsolved cases, and arrests that force the re-
moval of people from public streets for economic or political rea-
sons.12 It can also result in arrests based only on someone’s clothing 
or appearance.13 
Part II argues that courts have not, and will not, protect against 
the abuses of policing under LPP laws. Either in response to broader 
constitutional challenges brought pursuant to impact litigation or in 
the adjudication of individual criminal cases, courts rely on a legal 
framework fixed on notions of gender and sexuality that preclude 
effective safeguards.14 Legal challenges brought in courts fail 
 
N.E.2d 562, 564 (N.Y. 1976). When used with respect to the NYPD, “stop-and-
frisk” is meant to refer to a specific policing strategy described in infra Part III. 
Of course, LPP policing, unlike the majority of police encounters under NYPD’s 
stop-and-frisk regime, results in actual arrests and criminal court involvement, as 
opposed to unlawful police harassment that does not result in an arrest. See Adam 
Gabbatt, Stop-and-Frisk: Only 3% of 2.4m Stops Result in Conviction, Report 
Finds, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2013, 1:18 PM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2013/nov/14/stop-and-frisk-new-york-conviction-rate (“[A]round 
6% of the 2.4m stops between 2009 and 2012 led to arrests – 150,000 in total.”). 
Still, “gendered stop-and-frisk” is an appropriate term because of the parallels in 
the unlawfulness of police conduct that generally escapes scrutiny. 
 12 See, e.g., Struening, supra note 2, at 40–42 (“[R]eporters also speculated 
that the enactment of the state’s new anti-loitering law was timed to coincide with 
the upcoming Democratic National Convention, to be held at Madison Square 
Garden.”). 
 13 See, e.g., Ricardo Cortés, An Arresting Gaze: How One New York Law 
Turns Women into Suspects, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.vani-
tyfair.com/culture/2017/08/nypd-prostitution-laws (“A woman may be surveilled, 
searched, and detained, in part because an officer takes issue with her clothing.”). 
 14 See, e.g., People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1036 (N.Y. 1978) (“[B]ased 
on particulars obvious to and discernible by any trained law enforcement officer, 
it would be a simple task to differentiate between casual street encounters and a 
series of acts of solicitation for prostitution.”). 
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because LPP arrests are not ultimately about prostitution itself but 
about sexual behavior and who has the right to exist in public 
spaces.15 Without question, LPP policing also makes up part of a 
broader tapestry of petty offense enforcement that is about social 
control and the resulting criminalization of poverty, race, and gen-
der.16 
Part III identifies the ways in which LPP laws remain problem-
atic even if there are times when they are not regularly enforced. 
While such laws may have fallen out of favor in certain jurisdic-
tions,17 they can reemerge when opportune for the government and 
law enforcement.18 The consistent threat of revived enforcement 
maintains the oppression of racialized and gendered policing. Part 
III also identifies the danger of other efforts to criminalize loitering 
for prostitution. Although it may be argued that the solution to the 
problems presented by LPP laws, as in so many other areas, simply 
lies in less policing and less enforcement, here, less isn’t enough. 
Instead, the direct repeal of these problematic laws is necessary. For-
tunately, as this Part highlights, a movement is building to do ex-
actly that. 
In the end, courts will not fix the problems intrinsic in LPP laws 
and policing. This is not an area where tinkering with existing law 
or practice suffices. Rather, to address discriminatory and unjust po-
licing, a more radical vision and abolitionist approach to the policing 
of prostitution and public spaces is required. An abolitionist ap-
proach, as employed in this Article, refers to a commitment to less 
law and policing and would necessarily include the repeal of LPP 
statutes altogether to remove a powerful and harmful tool from the 
“arsenal of the police.”19 
 
 15 See Bellafante, supra note 4. 
 16 See id. 
 17 See Struening, supra note 2, at 34–40. 
 18 See, e.g., Emma Whitford, Surge in Prostitution Related Loitering Charges 
Affects Undocumented Immigrants, DOCUMENTED (Dec. 19, 2018, 1:00 PM), 
https://documentedny.com/2018/12/19/surge-in-loitering-charges-may-affect-
undocumented-immigrants/. 
 19 See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165 (1972). 
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PART I 
Section 240.37 was enacted in 1976 and reads as follows: 
Any person who remains or wanders about in a pub-
lic place and repeatedly beckons to, or repeatedly 
stops, or repeatedly attempts to stop, or repeatedly 
attempts to engage passers-by in conversation, or re-
peatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicles, or 
repeatedly interferes with the free passage of other 
persons, for the purpose of prostitution as that term 
is defined in article two hundred thirty of this part, 
shall be guilty of a violation and is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor if such person has previously been 
convicted of a violation of this section or of section 
230.00 of this part.20 
Additional subsections of the statute also criminalize loitering 
for the purpose of promoting prostitution or patronizing a person for 
prostitution.21 
Concerns with section 240.37 at the time of enactment are well 
documented.22 The constitutionality of the statute was tested almost 
immediately upon its passage, a challenge which was successful at 
the trial court level but then reversed by the intermediate court and 
affirmed by the highest court.23 New York’s Court of Appeals 
 
 20 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.37(2.) (Consol. 2020). 
 21 See id. §§ 240.37(1.)–(4.). 
 22 See, e.g., Struening, supra note 2, at 40–42; see also Amended Complaint 
and Demand for a Jury Trial at ¶ 5 & n.3, D.H. v. City of New York, No. 16-cv-
07698-PKC-KNF (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2017) [hereinafter D.H. Amended Com-
plaint] (quoting Letter from Harold Baer, Jr. to Hon. Judah Gribetz, Counsel to 
the Governor (June 15, 1976), which noted that while the “prostitution problem   
. . . has reached critical proportions,” section 240.37 is “unconstitutional” and 
would invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement) (also quoting N.Y. State 
Bar Ass'n, Legislation Report, No. 84 (1976), which showed that section 240.37 
has “deficiencies . . . so glaring as to require our disapproval without regard to 
questions of the efficacy and underlying policy,” and observed that the law pro-
vided a “shortcut” for police because the “standards of probable cause” are 
“dropp[ed]” and “[w]omen who are suspected of being prostitutes are arrested on 
sight, not because they are committing any unlawful act but because they are con-
sidered ‘undesirable’”). 
 23 See People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1033–34 (N.Y. 1978). 
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upheld the law in 1978.24 Unsurprisingly, more than four decades of 
section 240.37’s enforcement have confirmed that the statute sup-
ports problematic policing practices, which has resulted in pro-
nounced disparities in arrests.25 
Contemporary arrests mirror those that took place when the law 
first went into effect. In 1976, Toni Smith was one of the first 
women charged under the newly enacted section 240.37.26 The pros-
ecution alleged that an officer observed her in the early morning 
hours on a public street in Manhattan at a location where there had 
been numerous previous arrests for prostitution.27 During a brief pe-
riod, the officer observed Ms. Smith approach three men.28 With the 
third man, she entered a building at the location, came out several 
minutes later, and was arrested.29 On February 3, 2016, officers from 
the 83rd Precinct in Brooklyn arrested Natasha Martin under section 
240.37.30 The prosecution alleged that an officer observed Ms. Mar-
tin in the early morning hours on a public street in Brooklyn at a 
location “frequented by people engaging in promoting prostitu-
tion.”31 During a brief period, the officer observed Ms. Martin ap-
proach three passersby, after which she was arrested.32 
Women of color face disproportionate numbers of arrests under 
the law.33 Transgender and gender non-conforming individuals are 
also frequently targeted for arrest,34 so much so that the law has been 
characterized as a “Walking While Trans Ban.”35 Arrests are based 
 
 24 Id. at 1033. 
 25 Sex Workers at Risk: Condoms as Evidence of Prostitution in Four U.S. 
Cities, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 19, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/re-
port/2012/07/19/sex-workers-risk/condoms-evidence-prostitution-four-us-cities 
[hereinafter Sex Workers at Risk]. 
 26 See Smith, 378 N.E.2d at 1033. 
 27 Id. at 1036–37. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 1037. 
 30 D.H. Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶¶ 167–68, 171. 
 31 Id. ¶ 171. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. ¶¶ 91–95. 
 34 Id. ¶¶ 71–75. 
 35 See, e.g., Karina Piser, The Walking While Trans Ban Is ‘Stop and Frisk 
2.0’, NATION (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/activism/walk-
ing-while-trans-repeal/; David Klepper, Sex Workers Seek End of ‘Walking While 
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on the clothing people wear, how they look, the streets they stand 
on, and who they speak to, rather than any evidence of criminal con-
duct.36 Men and white women engaging in similar conduct are not 
policed in the same way, if at all.37 
Despite being a New York State statute, arrests under section 
240.37 are overwhelmingly concentrated in the five New York City 
boroughs38 (each of which comprises a separate county) and the 
NYPD uses section 240.37 overwhelmingly in neighborhoods 
where residents are people of color.39 As a result, civil rights and 
community advocates have extensively chronicled the damage po-
licing under section 240.37 causes in these largely marginalized 
communities.40 
In September 2016, a group of women who had been arrested 
for LPP offenses in different counties in New York City brought a 
lawsuit against the NYPD in the Southern District of New York.41 
The plaintiffs in D.H. v. City of New York asserted numerous claims 
involving the statute’s enforcement and their own arrests. Most crit-
ically, they alleged that section 240.37 was unconstitutionally vague 
and overly broad and that the NYPD intentionally discriminated on 
the basis of race, gender, and gender identity in making arrests under 
its guise.42 They argued that they had been arrested because they 
were known to police because they had previously been arrested for 
 
Trans’ Loitering Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 7, 2019), https://ap-
news.com/2eb3876a208d48929db1c2dae769129f. 
 36 See, e.g., Piser, supra note 35. 
 37 D.H. Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶ 98. 
 38 See Press Release, Cleary Gottlieb & The Legal Aid Soc’y, The Legal Aid 
Soc’y & Cleary Gottlieb Challenge the Constitutionality of N.Y.’s Loitering for 
Prostitution Law: Demand an End to NYPD’s Arbitrary and Discriminatory En-
forcement of the Law Against Women of Color (Sept. 30, 2016) [hereinafter 




 39 D.H. Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶ 97. 
 40 See, e.g., MAKE THE RD. N.Y., TRANSGRESSIVE POLICING: POLICE ABUSE 
OF LGBTQ COMMUNITIES OF COLOR IN JACKSON HEIGHTS 6, 10–14 (2012), 
https://maketheroadny.org/pix_re-
ports/MRNY_Transgressive_Policing_Full_Report_10.23.12B.pdf. 
 41 D.H. Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 42 Id. ¶¶ 1–10. 
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prostitution, were targeted simply for being transgender women, or 
that the police used a Section 240.37 arrest to extensively debrief 
them about unrelated activity or investigations.43 
The plaintiffs exposed how NYPD engages in “sweeps,” multi-
ple arrests at the same time targeted at specific locations and specific 
groups of women.44 The complaint also alleged that NYPD routinely 
arrests people under section 240.37 without probable cause, often 
specifically because of race, color, ethnicity, gender, gender iden-
tity, or appearance, constituting a “pattern and widespread practice 
of unlawful surveillance, stops, questioning, frisks, searches, sei-
zures and/or arrests and detention of women of color, including 
transgender women, engaged in wholly innocent conduct, such as 
walking in public spaces or speaking with other pedestrians.”45 
In addition to the facial constitutional challenge to the statute 
itself, the complaint identified several elements of NYPD practice 
under section 240.37 that violated constitutional standards and in-
fringed upon the putative class’s liberty interests.46 These included 
the category of arrests based merely on the fact that the police rec-
ognized that an individual had been arrested for prostitution be-
fore.47 The D.H. plaintiffs identified this as a “self-perpetuating cy-
cle” that “unlawfully prejudices any woman who has ever been ar-
rested, even if the charges underlying her original arrest were dis-
missed.”48 
Similarly, officers rely on the fact that a location was “prostitu-
tion-prone” when making arrests under section 240.37.49 The com-
plaint pointed out that this, too was self-substantiating, rather than 
based in objective fact, as arrests were only indicative of where 
 
 43 Id. ¶¶ 9–10. 
 44 Id. ¶ 9. 
 45 Id. ¶ 10. 
 46 Id. ¶¶ 9, 69–70. 
 47 Id. Plaintiff Sarah Marchando alleged that because of her “long history of 
prostitution-related arrests,” police officers “kn[e]w [her] by face and last name” 
and “[b]ecause of her criminal record and previous proximity to the precinct, the 
police target[ed] [her] for arrest when they s[aw] her outside, and she [was] often 
arrested for loitering for the purpose of prostitution when engaged in wholly in-
nocent conduct.” Id. ¶ 220. 
 48 Id. ¶ 85. 
 49 Id. ¶ 88. 
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police choose to deploy resources rather than the actual prevalence 
of prostitution.50 
The plaintiffs also emphasized the unlawfulness of arrests based 
solely on an individual’s appearance.51 Pre-printed affidavits used 
by the NYPD to document allegations against individuals arrested 
for LPP offenses include a box for officers to check that the individ-
ual was “dressed in provocative or revealing clothing.”52 
All of this taken together vividly demonstrated the problems 
with section 240.37 and its enforcement. Plaintiffs offered extensive 
evidence demonstrating that, under section 240.37, “women of color 
are subject to arrest for innocent conduct in a manner and with a 
frequency that others not belonging to this group are not.”53 Yet, as 
explored in more detail in Part II, the court dismissed the majority 
of plaintiffs’ claims in January 2018.54 
A few months later, in June 2018, with the dismissal decision 
stayed, the case entered mediation and the NYPD changed its pro-
cedures regarding LPP arrests.55 The Department amended its patrol 
guide—the internal document governing arrest procedures—to re-
quire officers effectuating LPP arrests to provide additional details 
regarding the basis for each arrest.56 This was to be a safeguard 
against problematic or baseless arrests.57 D.H. reached a final settle-
ment in April 2019.58 
 
 50 Id. ¶ 88. 
 51 Id. ¶ 86. 
 52 Id.; see infra Part II. 
 53 D.H. Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶ 98. 
 54 See D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 55 See New York City Police Department Patrol Guide Timeline, NYC, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/Up-
date.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2020) (stating that § 208-45 was updated on June 
11, 2018); see also Emma Whitford, NYPD Amends Patrol Guide to Curb ‘Walk-
ing While Trans’ Arrests, QUEENS DAILY EAGLE (June 6, 2019), 
https://queenseagle.com/all/loitering-law-transwomen-nypd-amended-profiling. 
 56 See generally N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, PATROL GUIDE: PROCEDURE NO. 208-
45—LOITERING FOR PURPOSES OF PROSTITUTION (2020) [hereinafter NYPD 
PATROL GUIDE 2020]; New York City Police Department Patrol Guide Timeline, 
supra note 55; see also Tracy, supra note 8. 
 57 Explaining the patrol guide changes, the NYPD indicated its commitment 
to “providing clarity to our officers on loitering enforcement.” Tracy, supra note 
8. 
 58 D.H. Stipulation and Order of Dismissal, supra note 8. 
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The patrol guide changes were not radical. The amendment to 
the section governing LPP arrests removed from the list of potential 
bases for arrest the language that that someone was a “known pros-
titute” or “consorts with known prostitutes or pimps.”59 Moving for-
ward, officers making LPP arrests would be required to document 
more details of what they observed prior to making the arrests.60 The 
most significant change was the addition of a directive that 
“[g]ender, gender identity, clothing, and location are not sufficient 
alone or together to establish probable cause.”61 
Surprisingly, in the months following the patrol guide change, 
LPP arrests across New York City began to rise.62 Although arrests 
for LPP in New York State had declined significantly from 2010 to 
2016, the number of arrests in New York City nearly tripled from 
2017 to 2018, the majority of which occurred after the NYPD 
amended its patrol guide.63 
In December 2018, several months after the patrol guide changes 
went into effect, police officers from the 115th Precinct in Queens 
made a section 240.37 arrest that was then prosecuted on the accu-
satory instrument excerpted above.64 Notably, the complaint 
charged that one of the reasons arresting officers believed the 
woman they arrested was loitering with the purpose of prostitution 
was because she wore her clothes in such a way as to expose “her 
buttocks and cervix area.”65 A cervix is an internal organ, located on 
the lower part of one’s uterus.66 The cervix is not visible unless one 
 
 59 N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, PATROL GUIDE: PROCEDURE NO. 208-45—
LOITERING FOR PURPOSES OF PROSTITUTION (2013). 
 60 See Tracy, supra note 8. 
 61 NYPD PATROL GUIDE 2020, supra note 56. 
 62 See Whitford, supra note 18. 
 63 Whereas in 2017, the NYPD made 50 arrests under section 240.37, that 
number increased to 139 in 2018. See Top Charge PL 230, PL 240.37, ED 6512 
Arrests by County, 2009–2018, DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVICES, 
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/stats.htm (accessed Nov. 15, 
2019) [hereinafter Top Arrest Charge]. 
 64 See Criminal Court Complaint, Dec. 12, 2018, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 65 Id. at 2. 
 66 See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., COMPREHENSIVE CERVICAL CANCER 
CONTROL: A GUIDE TO ESSENTIAL PRACTICE 32 (2d ed. 2014), 
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conducts an internal examination with a speculum.67 A police officer 
could not observe one’s cervix on the street, even if a person were 
wearing nothing below the waist.68 
Nonetheless, these purported police observations led to an arrest 
for LPP.69 A search incident to that arrest yielded a glass pipe with 
a small amount of cocaine residue, resulting in additional drug 
charges.70 As the arrest made its way through the criminal legal sys-
tem, a prosecutor drew up the accusatory instrument commencing 
the prosecution based on the police paperwork and included the al-
legation of the exposed cervix,71 despite its factual impossibility.72 
Next, a local criminal court arraigned the arrested an individual on 
this accusatory instrument.73 Ultimately, the prosecution of the mis-
demeanor Section 240.37 charges required over a dozen appear-
ances in court and, most significantly for the individual arrested, 
also included a short period of incarceration.74 
Putting aside issues of basic anatomy, this arrest and prosecution 
demonstrate several of the well-documented and widespread issues 
inherent in the policing of loitering for prostitution.75 LPP laws cen-
ter on the criminalization of appearance, gender expression, and per-
ceived sexual behavior further complicated by unavoidable issues of 




sionid=3E18E8DDC37D2D317C3507E9BB3EBE91?sequence=1 (“The lower 
part of the cervix (ectocervix) lies within the vagina and is visible with a specu-
lum; the upper two thirds of the cervix (endocervix) lies above the vagina and is 
not visible.”). 
 67 Id. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See Criminal Court Complaint, Dec. 12, 2018, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 66, at 32. 
 73 See Appearance History, No. CR-041477-18QN (Crim. Ct. Queens Co., 
Dec. 12, 2018) (on file with author). 
 74 See id. 
 75 See, e.g., Cleary Gottlieb & Legal Aid Press Release, supra note 38; 
Melissa Gira Grant, The NYPD Arrests Women for Who They Are and Where They 
Go — Now They’re Fighting Back, VILLAGE VOICE (Nov. 22, 2016), 
https://www.villagevoice.com/2016/11/22/the-nypd-arrests-women-for-who-
they-are-and-where-they-go-now-theyre-fighting-back/. 
 76 See Cleary Gottlieb & Legal Aid Press Release, supra note 38. 
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attempting to talk to people of one gender on the street gives rise to 
probable cause for loitering with the purpose of prostitution is 
astounding. Yet, arrests are often premised on even fewer facts than 
those in the Queens accusatory instrument.77 
An analysis of arrest data and court documents from nearly fifty 
LPP arrests in the four months immediately following NYPD’s pa-
trol guide amendment illustrates the concrete dangers of ongoing ar-
rests and prosecutions under section 240.37. 
Over half of the charging documents reference the arrested indi-
vidual’s clothing, even though the amended patrol guide specifically 
prohibits the consideration of clothing,78 either together with other 
factors or alone, as probable cause that someone is loitering for the 
purpose of prostitution.79 Among the clothing alleged to be proba-
tive of criminality, police officers noted a “black jacket, blue jeans, 
and grey boots,”80 a “sleeveless black dress,”81 or a “red and black 
mini dress and a beige cardigan” that the arresting officer deemed 
“provocative.”82 
In various cases, NYPD officers determined arrestees’ purposes 
to be prostitution from the fact that they wore “black cowboy boots, 
 
 77 See, e.g., Criminal Court Complaint at 1, No. CR-040816-18KN (N.Y. 
Crim. Ct. Sept. 7, 2018) [hereinafter Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 7, 2018] 
(on file with author) (totality of facts alleging section 240.37 in accusatory instru-
ment that on a “public street, in an industrial area, which is not in front of a bus 
stop or other places were [sic] people generally congregate, the [arresting officer] 
observed the defendant standing at said location for approximately ten minutes 
and further observed the defendant beckoning to passing motorists and observed 
the defendant approach three vehicles and moped [sic], of which the occupants 
were male”). 
 78 See NYPD PATROL GUIDE 2020, supra note 56. 
 79 See, e.g., infra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. 
 80 Supporting Deposition at 1, No. CR-046252-18KN (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Oct. 
18, 2018) (on file with author). 
 81 Criminal Court Complaint at 2, No. CR-031724-18QN (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
Sept. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 8, 2018] (on file with 
author). 
 82 Criminal Court Complaint at 1, No. CR-032015-18QN (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 12, 2018] (on file 
with author). 
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and black shorts,”83 or “shorts and a tank top,”84 or “a multi color 
short dress and sandals.”85 Equally as confounding as the fact that 
the clothing someone wears can be the basis for an arrest, however, 
is that clothing was cited in over half of the arrests looked at after 
the patrol guide was changed to make clear that clothing cannot be 
a factor in establishing probable cause for LPP. 
The majority of LPP arrests during this period also rely on the 
perceived genders of the individuals observed or arrested.86 Almost 
all note the fact that the arrestee, a female, interacted with only 
males during the period of the officer’s observations.87 Complaints 
refer to “lone males” and assert that the person arrested did not speak 
to any female passers-by during the observation period.88 
Gender stereotypes form the backbone of allegations against in-
dividuals arrested for LPP.89 Accordingly, accusatory instruments 
rely on several flawed premises to charge LPP—that only women 
sell sex, that only men buy sex, and that sex only occurs between 
men and women.90 The accusatory framework is strictly heteronor-
mative.91 While this may have sufficed to justify arrests taking place 
in the 1970s, when looked at today it grossly misaligns with the un-
derstanding of gender, sexuality, and norms regarding behavior in 
public as they have evolved. 
 
 83 Criminal Court Complaint at 1, No. CR-026405-18QN (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
July 21, 2018) [hereinafter Criminal Court Complaint, July 21, 2018] (on file with 
author). 
 84 Criminal Court Complaint at 1, No. CR-026412-18QN (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
July 22, 2018) (on file with author). 
 85 Criminal Court Complaint at 1, No. CR-028516-18QN (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
Aug. 22, 2018) (on file with author). 
 86 See, e.g., Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 12, 2018, supra note 82, at 1–2; 
Criminal Court Complaint, July 21, 2018, supra note 83, at 1–2. 
 87 See, e.g., Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 12, 2018, supra note 82, at 1–2; 
Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 8, 2018, supra note 81, at 1; Criminal Court 
Complaint, July 21, 2018, supra note 83, at 1–2. 
 88 See, e.g., Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 7, 2018, supra note 77, at 1; 
Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 12, 2018, supra note 82, at 1. 
 89 See Legislative Memo: Loitering Repeal, N.Y. C.L. UNION, 
https://www.nyclu.org/en/legislation/legislative-memo-loitering-repeal (last vis-
ited Apr. 9, 2020) (“But to make an LPP arrest under § 240.37, they have little to 
rely on besides race and gender stereotypes of what a ‘prostitute’ looks like.”). 
 90 See id. 
 91 See Bellafante, supra note 4. 
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Further, even crediting that the purpose of an observed interac-
tion may be sexual in nature, these allegations also take for granted 
that sex must be commercial—sexual conduct in exchange for a 
fee—rather than simply consensual non-commercial sex.92 That 
gender and sexual norms could be utilized in this way stands out 
more as a relic than an appropriate basis for a criminal prosecution. 
Nevertheless, arrests continue. 
The wide latitude afforded police officers under section 240.37 
and other LPP statutes allows for abuse and targeting. For example, 
when police decide to crack down on narcotics activity in a specific 
area but fail to make any drug-related arrests, they can turn to the 
LPP statute.93 Section 240.37 allows them to detain and question 
individuals without having to actually make an arrest for drug of-
fenses, which would require that they recover drugs as physical ev-
idence.94 
Furthermore, as argued above, police flout even the minimal 
protections intended by any procedural reform.95 In 2015, the New 
York State legislature took steps to limit problematic section 240.37 
arrests, specifically with respect to police seizing condoms from ar-
rested individuals and using the fact that the individual had condoms 
as evidence of LPP.96 It amended the Criminal Procedure Law to 
provide that 
[e]vidence that a person was in possession of one or 
more condoms may not be admitted at any trial, hear-
ing, or other proceeding in a prosecution for section 
230.00 or section 240.37 of the penal law for the pur-
pose of establishing probable cause for an arrest or 
proving any person’s commission or attempted com-
mission of such offense.97 
Police and prosecutors used the fact of condom possession, al-
most exclusively against women, as a way to show intent to engage 
 
 92 See Struening, supra note 2, at 29–30. 
 93 See Whitford, supra note 18. 
 94 See id. 
 95 See, e.g., supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. 
 96 See Susan Bryant, 2015 Legislative Review, PUB. DEF. BACKUP CTR. REP., 
Jan.-Apr. 2016, at 8, 10–11. 
 97 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.47 (Consol. 2020). 
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in prostitution.98 Bearing this out to its logical conclusion, the infer-
ence put forward by the NYPD, and accepted by courts adjudicating 
LPP cases, was that there was simply no other reason why a woman 
would carry condoms unless she was engaging in prostitution.99 
Yet, nearly 15% of the LPP cases analyzed in 2018 specifically 
alleged condom possession as a factor indicating the arrested indi-
vidual’s purpose was to engage in prostitution.100 As a result of 
NYPD’s practice, both before and after the legislative prohibition, 
women who find themselves frequently stopped by the police either 
carry fewer condoms or cease to carry condoms at all for fear it 
could lead to arrest.101 That men can carry condoms without the 
same fear exposes gendered and deeply engrained notions of appro-
priate sexual behavior. Women are meant to be chaste.102 Any sex-
ual activity should take place inside the home, with a male spouse.103 
 
 98 See Sex Workers at Risk, supra note 25 (documenting widespread police 
practice of stopping individuals on the street, searching them for condoms and 
then arresting them for loitering for prostitution if condoms were found, and spe-
cifically noting that “[i]n New York, Washington, DC, and Los Angeles, many 
people, particularly members of the transgender community, told Human Rights 
Watch they were stopped and searched for condoms while walking home from 
school, going to the grocery store, and waiting for the bus”); see also Molly 
Crabapple, New York Cops Will Arrest You for Carrying Condoms, VICE (Mar. 5, 
2013, 10:36 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/3b5mx9/new-york-cops-
will-arrest-you-for-carrying-condoms. 
 99 This practice was widely criticized as it jeopardized public health and cre-
ated an increased risk of sexually transmitted infection. See, e.g., Sex Workers at 
Risk, supra note 25. 
 100 For example, in July 2018, another accusatory instrument supporting a 
prosecution under Section 240.37 alleged a factor leading arresting officers to 
conclude the individual arrested was loitering for the purpose of prostitution was 
that they recovered three condoms from her purse. See Criminal Court Complaint 
at 3, No. CR-025820-18QN (N.Y. Crim. Ct. July 24, 2018) (on file with author); 
see also Criminal Court Complaint, Sept. 12, 2018, supra note 82, at 2 (arresting 
officer noted that defendant had thirty-two condoms in her purse). 
 101 See, e.g., Adam Edelman, Condom Conundrum: New York Sex Workers 
Said to Be Avoiding Condoms as They’re Used More Frequently as Evidence of 
Prostitution, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 5, 2013, 7:55 PM), https://www.nydailyn-
ews.com/news/national/arrested-carrying-condoms-new-york-article-1.1280431. 
 102 See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality Li-
cense: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 
66–67 (2002). 
 103 See id. at 69. 
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Women who carry condoms with them outside the home are deviant, 
suspect, and worthy of arrest and prosecution.104 
No degree of procedural reform will reduce the harm of LPP po-
licing. Attempts at prohibiting certain evidence from being used 
against arrested individuals or amending the patrol guide to preclude 
certain factors as the basis for arrest have proven futile.105 Years af-
ter both the condom prohibition and the patrol guide amendment, 
women still face arrest and prosecution under section 240.37 for 
simply standing in a public place and talking to other people.106 Po-
lice documents that form the basis of a prosecution still contain 
places for officers to indicate provocative or revealing clothing and 
condom possession.107 Statutes like section 240.37 serve to further 
legitimize and insulate discriminatory police practices.108 As the 
next Section details, the unfettered discretion LPP laws bestow on 
the police is impervious to challenge in the courts. 
PART II 
LPP arrests in New York bear out the exact dangers foreshad-
owed by earlier cases invalidating loitering and vagrancy statutes. 
In 1972, four years before section 240.37 was enacted, the Supreme 
Court struck down a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance which crimi-
nalized and “deemed vagrants”: 
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go 
about begging, common gamblers, persons who use 
juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunk-
ards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or 
pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton 
and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, 
common railers and brawlers, persons wandering or 
strolling around from place to place without any law-
ful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly 
 
 104 See Edelman, supra note 101. 
 105 See supra notes 36–37, 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 106 Criminal Court Complaint at 1, No. CR-042933-19KN (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
Dec. 6, 2019) (on file with author). 
 107 See, e.g., Supporting Deposition – Loitering for Prostitution at 1–2, No. 
CR-042933-19KN (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Dec. 6, 2019) (on file with author). 
 108 See Crabapple, supra note 98. 
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persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and 
habitually spending their time by frequenting houses 
of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic 
beverages are sold or served, persons able to work 
but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives 
or minor children.109 
In doing so, the Court warned of making “criminal activities which 
by modern standards are normally innocent.”110 
On the other hand, the district court hearing the recent constitu-
tional challenge to section 240.37 denied the plaintiffs’ claim that 
the statute was unconstitutionally vague.111 Rather, the D.H. court 
held that “it constrains police discretion by specifying certain con-
duct that an officer must observe—conduct which the statute re-
quires to occur repeatedly—and by limiting its reach to conduct 
done for the purpose of prostitution.”112 This reasoning echoed the 
New York Court of Appeals decision from 1978, which found sec-
tion 240.37 constitutional and not overly vague: 
[B]ased on particulars obvious to and discernible by 
any trained law enforcement officer, it would be a 
simple task to differentiate between casual street en-
counters and a series of acts of solicitation for pros-
titution, between the canvas of a female political ac-
tivist and the maneuvers of a Times Square prosti-
tute.113 
These decisions stand in stark contrast to the long line of cases 
striking down ordinances and criminal laws for vagueness.114 New 
 
 109 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156 n.1 (1972). 
 110 Id. at 163. 
 111 D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 112 Id. at 72 (emphasis added). 
 113 People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1036 (N.Y. 1978); see also Carmen v. 
Carey, No. 78 Civ. 438, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11104, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
18, 1982) (granting dismissal for the reasons given in People v. Smith). 
 114 See, e.g., Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162; City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 
U.S. 41, 64 (1999). Courts have also been willing to invalidate laws for vagueness 
where they apply to individuals required to register as sex offenders, Valenti v. 
Hartford City, 225 F. Supp. 3d 770, 789–90 (N.D. Ind. 2016), or homeless 
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York’s LPP statute has been distinguished because of its require-
ment that an arrest be limited to instances where one’s purpose is to 
engage in an act of prostitution.115 Frequently referred to as “loiter-
ing plus,” it has passed constitutional muster because it has been 
taken for granted that the purpose required by the statute is objective 
and discernible.116 Yet, the objectiveness that purportedly salvages 
laws like section 240.37 rests on gender, appearance, and behavior 
in public, none of which is an objective measure of whether some-
one’s purpose is prostitution. 
The NYPD’s arrest practice and the experience of people ar-
rested under section 240.37 undercut the finding that the statute has 
safeguards that are objective, specific, or clear.117 In fact, several 
individual NYPD officer-defendants in D.H. testified that the lan-
guage of section 240.37 is “arbitrary,” “subjective,” and not “clear-
cut,” and that there are no consistent standards governing what con-
stitutes sufficient conduct for an arrest under the statute.118 
The presumptions engendered in declaring the “purpose” re-
quirement to be the statute’s saving grace are eerily reminiscent of 
arguments the Supreme Court discredited when striking down the 
Jacksonville ordinance.119 In Papachristou, Justice Douglas made 
clear that the notion that people who “look suspicious to the police 
are to become future criminals is too precarious for a rule of law.”120 
The Court refused to uphold a law on the justification that “crime is 
being nipped in the bud” as that was simply “too extravagant to de-
serve extended treatment.”121 
 
individuals, Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 
2014). See also Guyora Binder & Brenner Fissell, A Political Interpretation of 
Vagueness Doctrine, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1527, 1563–66; Short v. City of Bir-
mingham, 393 So. 2d 518, 522–23 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); City of Akron v. Mas-
sey, 381 N.E.2d 1362, 1366 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1978). 
 115 See D.H., 309 F. Supp. 3d at 72–73. 
 116 See Smith, 378 N.E.2d at 1036; D.H., 309 F. Supp. 3d at 72–73; see also 
Silvar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Cty. of Clark, 129 P.3d 682, 689 (Nev. 
2006). 
 117 See supra Part I. 
 118 Request for Leave to Amend the Amended Complaint at 3, D.H. v. City of 
New York, No. 1:16-cv-07698-PKC-KNF (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2018). 
 119 See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
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The Supreme Court again considered the constitutionality of an 
individual’s purpose on the street, as ascertained by the police, as a 
basis for arrest when it invalidated Chicago’s gang loitering ordi-
nance in 1999.122 The ordinance prohibited “criminal street gang 
members” from loitering and refusing to disperse after an officer’s 
order.123 Loitering was defined as “remain[ing] in any one place 
with no apparent purpose.”124 
Evaluating the Chicago ordinance in terms of the notice it af-
forded members of the public, the Court took specific issue with the 
notion that “apparent purpose” could be determined in a way that 
satisfied constitutional standards: 
It is difficult to imagine how any citizen of the city 
of Chicago standing in a public place with a group of 
people would know if he or she had an “apparent pur-
pose.” If she were talking to another person, would 
she have an apparent purpose? If she were frequently 
checking her watch and looking expectantly down 
the street, would she have an apparent purpose?125 
Against this backdrop, it is difficult to reconcile decisions find-
ing that LPP statutes, and section 240.37 specifically, pass constitu-
tional muster. Somehow, the skepticism regarding the vagueness of 
“purpose” and the difficulty of its determination falls away when 
courts evaluate LPP statutes.126 Once prostitution becomes the 
stated and prohibited purpose, the ability to ascertain purpose is 
taken as scientific, infallible and, ultimately, constitutionally ac-
ceptable.127 
When the purportedly objective elements are deconstructed, the 
distinction afforded LPP statutes is exposed as untenable. For exam-
ple, looking at the impact of clothing as the basis for arrest, the D.H. 
court concluded that “[t]he ‘obvious alternative explanation’ for 
considering clothing . . . is that the experience of a reasonable police 
 
 122 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 45–47 (1999). 
 123 Id. at 45–47. 
 124 Id. at 47 (alteration in original). 
 125 Id. at 56–57. 
 126 See, e.g., D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 71–73 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018). 
 127 See, e.g., id. 
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officer may be that a person seeking to make known to passers-by 
their willingness to engage in an act of prostitution will wear certain 
types of clothing.”128 
The D.H. court accepted the notion that clothing could be dis-
positive of a willingness to engage in prostitution.129 It did so despite 
evidence obtained in depositions that showed wide and unpredicta-
ble variation of interpretations of clothing among arresting offic-
ers.130 The kind of clothing that officers testified to be indicative of 
a criminal “purpose” of prostitution ranged from brightly-colored 
clothing, to jeans with rips, to sweatpants.131 As one defendant of-
ficer testified, “pretty much anything other than a nun’s outfit” could 
be indicative of a section 240.37 violation to police officers on pa-
trol.132 
Thus, conferring a level of authority in the evidentiary value of 
clothing choice in this way defies common sense, actual practice, 
and conflicts with existing caselaw looking at, for example, laws 
banning cross-dressing.133 For decades, courts have cast doubt on 
the practice of criminalizing  certain clothing choices.134 In striking 
down a cross-dressing ban in 1975, the Ohio Supreme Court cau-
tioned: 
Modes of dress for both men and women are histori-
cally subject to changes in fashion. At the present 
time, clothing is sold for both sexes which is so sim-
ilar in appearance that ‘a person of ordinary intelli-
gence’ might not be able to identify it as male or fe-
male dress. In addition, it is not uncommon today for 
individuals to purposely, but innocently, wear ap-
parel which is intended for wear by those of the op-
posite sex.135 
 
 128 Id. at 76. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See Request for Leave to Amend the Amended Complaint, supra note 118, 
at 3 n.7. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. (citing Deposition of NYPD Lieutenant Dave Siev). 
 133 See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Rogers, 324 N.E.2d 563, 565 (Ohio 1975). 
 134 See id. 
 135 Id. 
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Similarly, a local ordinance criminalizing clothing “not custom-
arily worn” by one’s sex “with the intent of committing any indecent 
or immoral act” failed to withstand constitutional scrutiny.136 The 
Ohio court noted that the ordinance 
goes so far as to bring under suspect the woman who 
wears one of her husband’s old shirts to paint lawn 
furniture, the trick or treater, the guests at a masquer-
ade party, or the entertainer. Such a standard is 
purely subjective and materially fluctuates from per-
son to person. Additionally, the element of an intent 
to commit an “indecent” or “immoral” act, while so 
dressed, represents an unascertainable standard.137 
Despite these well-articulated concerns, clothing remains deter-
minative and inevitable in section 240.37 arrests.138 Allowing this 
police practice to continue in LPP policing effectively sanctions a 
“fashion police.”139 The problems inherent in allowing policing 
based on appearance and clothing are abundant—and then amplified 
for marginalized individuals without political power against whom 
police do not hesitate to enforce the law.140 
A primary component of this is gender itself. If not for prostitu-
tion, why else would a woman speak to men, maybe men she did not 
know, on the street? Why else would a woman carry condoms or 
wear a short skirt? Courts sustain LPP laws and arrests based on an 
implicit analysis that certain women on certain streets at certain 
times wearing certain clothing talking to certain others could only 
be doing so for the purpose of prostitution.141 
Of course, this analysis would be incomplete if it did not also 
rest on race and class. Why else would this woman be on this street 
if not to prostitute? This woman is almost always a woman of color 
and this street is always a community where residents are people of 
 
 136 City of Cincinnati v. Adams, 330 N.E.2d 463, 464 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1974). 
 137 Id. at 466. 
 138 See Ginia Bellafante, Arrests by the Fashion Police, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/nyregion/arrests-by-the-fashion-
police.html. 
 139 Id.; see also Cortés, supra note 13. 
 140 See Cortés, supra note 13. 
 141 See, e.g., People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1036–37 (N.Y. 1978). 
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color.142 Because this analysis is implicit, it is not easily discerned 
or reflected within the four corners of court decisions or rulings. 
Courts further feel comfortable dismissing arguments of dis-
criminatory enforcement or unconstitutionality because they grant 
wide deference to police.143 Courts urge us to rest assured that police 
will be objective in their enforcement of LPP laws because of offic-
ers’ “training and experience . . . .”144 Countless criminal court com-
plaints contain this precise language.145 Officers must know and un-
derstand gender expression, appearance, and sexual behavior. But 
police are not able to sort behavior meant to signal commercial sex 
from other innocent non-criminal expression, even with specific ex-
pertise.146 
Why do LPP laws stand apart from other types of loitering, or 
even cross-dressing, laws that courts have invalidated? The only 
plausible hypothesis is the tacit acceptance that LPP laws will only 
be used in certain places against certain individuals and, therefore, 
do not run the danger that other statutes might. The objectivity 
courts read into LPP statutes is reinforced by constructs of privilege, 
 
 142 See supra notes 33–40 and accompanying text. 
 143 See, e.g., Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2043–44 (2017); see also People v. Martinez, 34 
N.Y.S.3d 558, 559–60 (N.Y. App. Term. 2016) (accusatory instrument sufficient 
to allege section 240.37 where arresting officer concluded, “based upon his train-
ing and experience with regard to prostitution-related offenses that [the arrested 
individual] was loitering for the purpose of prostitution”). 
 144 People v. Farra S., No. 2004 CN 003119, WL 1258162, at *5 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. June 1, 2004). 
 145 See, e.g., Criminal Court Complaint, July 21, 2018, supra note 83, at 2. In 
fact, this language has been explicitly sanctioned by the New York Court of Ap-
peals as it pertains to the validity of accusatory instruments. See People v. Dumas, 
497 N.E.2d 686, 686 (N.Y. 1986) (complaint insufficient where “no allegation 
that the police officer is an expert in identifying marihuana”); see also People v. 
Nunn, 882 N.Y.S.2d 887, 889 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2009) (describing how after People 
v. Dumas, “all complaints filed in Criminal Court now contain what has come to 
be called the ‘Dumas language’—that is, a statement detailing the Police Officer’s 
training and experience in the identification of controlled substances”). In the sec-
tion 240.37 context, see, for example, Farra S., WL 1258162, at *1, for a discus-
sion of how an accusatory instrument alleging section 240.37 was sufficient where 
arresting officer was “experienced in the field of prostitution crimes.” See also 
Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 
32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 345 (2005). 
 146 See Struening, supra note 2, at 29–30. 
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misogyny, and whiteness.147 Whereas courts may be concerned 
about wives painting lawn furniture or trick-or-treaters,148 decades 
of LPP enforcement have assured that enforcement will not inad-
vertently fall on anyone but intended subjects.149 Courts interpret 
vagueness challenges differently when they can foresee a statute’s 
wrongful application in communities of privilege and wealth or 
communities they deem less plagued with undesirable behavior or 
simply undesirable people.150 
This phenomenon plays out in the way the law looks at women 
who have previously been arrested for prostitution offenses. Police 
forms expressly invite officers to check a box indicating that an in-
dividual has previously been arrested for a prostitution offense, a 
basis for a section 240.37 arrest.151 Notably, the form contemplates 
mere arrests for prostitution regardless of whether the arrest results 
in a finding of guilt.152 Courts sanction this practice, even though 
evidence of prior bad acts or prior arrests seeking to prove some-
one’s propensity to engage in certain conduct is generally inadmis-
sible in other contexts.153 
 
 147 See Bellafante, supra note 4. 
The policing of female sexuality is something bourgeois 
women talk about often, with little understanding that what ex-
ists largely in the realm of metaphor for them remains, for poor 
women, a very literal and criminalizing surveillance of how 
they present themselves when they leave the house . . . .Just as 
it is unthinkable that the same strictures would apply to a black 
man drinking a tallboy on a sidewalk in East New York and a 
private equity investor having a glass of pinot noir on his stoop 
on East 93rd Street, it is inconceivable that a woman in Chelsea 
would be stopped by the police on her way to Barry’s Bootcamp 
in cropped leggings and a sports bra. 
Id. 
 148 See City of Cincinnati v. Adams, 330 N.E.2d 463, 466 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 
1974). 
 149 See Bellafante, supra note 4. 
 150 See, e.g., Adams, 330 N.E.2d at 466. 
 151 See Supporting Deposition – Loitering for Prostitution, supra note 107, at 
2. 
 152 Id. 
 153 See People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 293–95 (N.Y. 1901) (evidence of a 
defendant’s uncharged crimes or prior misconduct is not admissible if it cannot 
logically be connected to some specific material issue in the case, and tends only 
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Additionally, the D.H. court found that the plaintiffs did not 
have standing for injunctive relief because they had failed to prove 
the imminence of their injury.154 The plaintiffs argued that it was 
likely they would be wrongfully arrested again under section 240.37 
in three ways: (1) the NYPD used section 240.37 to arrest individu-
als with prior prostitution-related arrests merely on the basis of those 
prior arrests without additional probable cause; (2) several of the 
plaintiffs had experienced subsequent arrests and interactions with 
the police; and (3) the NYPD engaged in “sweeps” to arrest specific 
groups of people, like transgender women socializing in a particular 
area.155 
Despite the fact that one of the police officer-defendants had ex-
plicitly warned a plaintiff that if he “saw girls like them outside after 
midnight” in the future he would arrest them, the court found the 
allegations too remote and attenuated from the “pivotal” question of 
imminent injury.156 It is difficult to reconcile this, too, with the fore-
shadowing of Papachristou, where the Supreme Court warned that 
“[a]rresting a person on suspicion, like arresting a person for inves-
tigation, is foreign to our system, even when the arrest is for past 
criminality.”157 
On the question of discrimination on the basis of gender identity, 
several transgender plaintiffs described how the police misgendered 
them, referred to them as “he/she,” and inappropriately asked ques-
tions about their sex organs.158 In defending the police action, the 
City argued this did not sufficiently establish discriminatory animus. 
Instead, these “post-hoc gender references” were “rude” but not sub-
stantial enough to support a plausible inference that the decision to 
arrest any plaintiff was motivated by discriminatory animus.159 The 
 
to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime charged); see also 
People v. Rojas, 760 N.E.2d 1265, 1267 (N.Y. 2001) (“[A] criminal case should 
be tried on the facts and not on the basis of a defendant’s propensity to commit 
the crime charged.”); FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). 
 154 D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 66–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 155 Id. at 64, 66. 
 156 Id. at 66–67. 
 157 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972). 
 158 D.H. Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶¶ 132, 168, 185. 
 159 Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Partial Motion to 
Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 19, D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 
3d 52 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 1:16-cv-07698-PKC-KNF). 
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D.H. court agreed that these allegations did not support a plausible 
inference of targeting based on gender identity.160 
The D.H. court also found that statistics showing arrest dispari-
ties based on race and gender were not enough to show intentional 
discrimination.161 Accordingly, the court dismissed nearly all of the 
plaintiffs’ claims.162 
Constitutional challenges aside, one might assume that, if the 
policing is as lawless as described above, prosecutors or courts will 
offer some check on the practice. Certainly, there is a way in which 
problematic arrests could be identified, and addressed, post-ar-
rest.163 Of course, this would not obviate the harmful consequences 
of an arrest itself but could potentially provide some protection to 
individuals arrested unlawfully. 
In theory, prosecutors could decline to prosecute NYPD’s sec-
tion 240.37 arrests. The first place one might expect a check on 
problematic policing is in prosecutors who, post-arrest, are respon-
sible for commencing criminal actions and drawing up accusatory 
instruments.164 Yet, as the cervix example demonstrates, prosecutors 
frequently offer minimal, if any, screening of cases or protection 
against bad arrests.165 The tendency is simply to write up cases, 
 
 160 D.H., 309 F. Supp. 3d at 75. 
 161 Id. at 78–79. There are many reasons that it is difficult to prove intentional 
discrimination and racial profiling by the police. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Testing 
Racial Profiling: Empirical Assessment of Disparate Treatment by Police, 2016 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 485, 492. 
 162 D.H., 309 F. Supp. 3d at 82. 
 163 See, e.g., Zeidman, supra note 145, at 315. 
 164 See K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek Justice 
in an Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 286, 
306 (2014). It is worth noting here, as explored more in Part III, that at the time 
of writing, at least two elected prosecutors in New York City have demonstrated 
support for eradicating prosecution of LPP cases. See David Brand & Emma 
Whitford, Brooklyn DA, Others Urge Albany to Repeal Loitering Law and Enable 
Record-Clearing for Trafficking Victims Before End of Session, BROOKLYN 
DAILY EAGLE (June 19, 2019), https://brooklyneagle.com/arti-
cles/2019/06/19/brooklyn-da-others-urge-albany-to-repeal-loitering-law-and-en-
able-record-clearing-for-trafficking-victims-before-end-of-session/. This is sig-
nificant, given that over the years arrests under section 240.37 have largely been 
constrained to five New York City precincts. See Cleary Gottlieb & Legal Aid 
Press Release, supra note 38. 
 165 Zeidman, supra note 145, at 349. 
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initiate prosecutions, and let everything sort itself out in the adjudi-
cation process.166 
Then, once a prosecution commences, adjudicating courts fail to 
provide safeguards against police abuse under section 240.37.167 
Although criminal court arraignments are meant to ensure that ar-
rests, and resulting prosecutions, are premised on reasonable 
cause,168 arraignments are largely pro forma and rarely involve ex-
amination of the underlying circumstances of an arrest.169 Courts 
have the authority to dismiss accusatory instruments that fail to es-
tablish a criminal offense.170 Courts could acquit individuals 
charged at trial.171 But, the nature of misdemeanor criminal court 
practice is such that low-level criminal case adjudication actually 
precludes any safeguards against the type of policing described in 
Part I.172 
As Issa Kohler-Hausmann persuasively argues, factual adjudi-
cation simply is not the function of misdemeanor courts in New 
York City.173 Rather, under the managerial model of case pro-
cessing, minor offenses are handled in such a way as to mark, sort, 
and monitor individuals arrested in order to set the stage for future 
 
 166 See generally Anjali Pathmanathan, The Myth of Preliminary Due Process 
for Misdemeanor Prosecutions in New York, 42 HARBINGER 82, 85 (2018) (“Re-
grettably, however, the New York State Criminal Procedure Law (C.P.L.) fails to 
protect individuals accused of misdemeanors from unexamined and oftentimes 
unsupportable accusations.”). 
 167 Zeidman, supra note 145, at 323. 
 168 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40 (Consol. 2020). 
 169 See Zeidman, supra note 145, at 345. 
 170 Criminal courts are empowered to do this as early as arraignment, the first 
court appearance on a criminal action. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.45 (Consol. 
2020). Section 140.45 of the Criminal Procedure Law requires a local criminal 
court to dismiss an accusatory instrument when it is facially insufficient and when 
“the court is satisfied that on basis of the available facts or evidence it would be 
impossible to draw and file an accusatory instrument which is sufficient on its 
face.” Id.; see also People v. Machado, 698 N.Y.S.2d 416, 418 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 
1999). 
 171 Most subsections of P.L. 240.37 are Class B misdemeanors or violations 
that, when prosecuted within New York City, are tried without a jury pursuant to 
C.P.L. § 340.40. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.37 (Consol. 2020); N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 340.40 (Consol. 2020). 
 172 See, e.g., Zeidman, supra note 145, at 321. 
 173 See ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS 
AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 72–73 (2018). 
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contacts with the criminal legal system.174 Rarely, if ever, are the 
merits of an arrest scrutinized or facts found in accordance with the 
burdens and standards due process requires.175 
Yet, the D.H. court rested on the notion that reviewing courts 
would serve as a safeguard against “mistaken[]” arrests under sec-
tion 240.37.176 In upholding the statute, the court found it provided 
“‘define[d] boundaries sufficiently distinct’ for . . . juries, and ap-
pellate judges.”177 This reasoning contemplates a review of the va-
lidity of arrests that rarely, if ever, occurs in petty offense case ad-
judication.178 
Even in the few instances where an arrested individual chal-
lenges the validity of their arrest and prosecution, outcomes vary.179 
Consider, for example, how criminal courts evaluate the sufficiency 
of accusatory instruments charging section 240.37.180 Courts could 
rightfully take issue with the sparseness of allegations giving rise to 
LPP arrests considering the multiple innocent explanations for the 
conduct that forms the basis of a prosecution or the overall impossi-
bility of establishing that someone’s purpose was, in fact, 
 
 174 Id. at 79. 
 175 Id.; see also LISA LINDSAY, CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK: 
ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 25, 49 (Justin Barry ed., 2018), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFs/COURTS/nyc/criminal/2017-Annual-
Report.pdf (with nearly 200,000 misdemeanor arrests in New York City in 2017, 
there were only 645 trials on the merits, only 175 of which were jury trials). 
 176 D.H. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 52, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 177 Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)). 
 178 Id. 
 179 Zeidman, supra note 145, at 320. 
 180 C.P.L. 170.35 authorizes courts to dismiss accusatory instruments that fail 
to comply with C.P.L. 100.40, the section that requires that accusatory instru-
ments establish every element of, and provide reasonable cause to believe the de-
fendant committed, the charged offense. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.35 
(Consol. 2020); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.40 (Consol. 2020). 
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prostitution.181 Instead, courts grant wide deference to police in LPP 
arrests.182 Appellate courts offer little additional protection.183 
The long line of vagueness cases take notice of exactly this 
point.184 The Supreme Court in Papachristou went back to 1876 to 
decry the danger of impermissibly vague statutes that allow police 
to catch the widest nets possible and then 
leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could 
rightfully be detained, and who should be set at 
large. . . . While that was a federal case, the due pro-
cess implications are equally applicable to the States 
and to this vagrancy ordinance. Here the net cast is 
large, not to give the courts the power to pick and 
choose but to increase the arsenal of the police.185 
Put simply, it is difficult to conceive of an instance where an 
accusatory instrument charging section 240.37 could sustain reason-
able cause that someone has committed a criminal offense.186 Yet, 
 
 181 See Struening, supra note 2, at 29–30. 
 182 See, e.g., Decision & Order at 2, People v. Guzman, No. 2018CK002552 
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. Jan. 30, 2019) (accusatory instrument charging section 240.37 
was sufficient where, inter alia, “the officer knows the location as a place where 
the New York City Police Department has made numerous arrests for prostitution 
related offenses” and “based on the officer’s training and experience, he believes 
the defendant was loitering for the purpose of prostitution and not engaging in 
another activity, such as panhandling or squeegeeing”). 
 183 In a 2016 decision, the New York intermediate appellate court considered 
three consolidated cases—the individual charged had been arrested under section 
240.37 by officers in the same precinct three times only weeks apart. People v. 
Martinez, 34 N.Y.S.3d 558, 560 (N.Y. App. Term. 2016). She pleaded guilty to 
each offense. Id. at 559–60. In assessing the challenges to the sufficiency of the 
complaints, the court vacated two convictions, but sustained the third, finding the 
allegations sufficient to support a conviction where police observed the arrested 
individual for a few minutes. Id. at 560. The accusatory instrument in the case 
established that she “‘attempted to stop 3 male passersby and 3 male motorists’; 
that the arresting officer ‘has seen the defendant . . . on other occasions engaging 
in the same conduct’ and ‘previously arrested defendant for a prostitution related 
offense.’” Id. 
 184 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165 (1972). 
 185 Id. (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 186 See Struening, supra note 2, at 29–30. 
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cases are routinely prosecuted, and people face all the attendant con-
sequences of even a low-level criminal prosecution.187 
Additionally, since 2013, prostitution-related offenses in New 
York City and other parts of the state are diverted into diversion 
courts that further distance adjudication of the case from an evalua-
tion of the circumstances of the arrest.188 When cases are adjudi-
cated in diversion courts, there is a strong incentive for prosecuted 
individuals to agree to program dispositions that preclude the possi-
bility of a trial on the merits.189 Individuals can avoid a criminal 
conviction or certain sentences if they participate in court-mandated 
programming.190 As a result, since 2013, virtually no LPP cases pro-
ceeded to trial in New York.191 Arresting officers do not have to 
justify the LPP arrests they make.192 They are not held accountable 
as they do not have to testify as to the details of an arrest or explain 
the factors on which they rely.193 Criminal courts rarely, if ever, ex-
plore the underlying circumstances of an arrest so as to offer any 
protection or oversight.194 Section 240.37 arrests in New York re-
main insulated from review.195 
Accordingly, whether in civil litigation or through the adjudica-
tion of individual criminal cases, courts do not provide adequate 
safeguards against the type of discriminatory policing facilitated by 
 
 187 See, e.g., Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 818–19, 
821–22 (2015); Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor 
Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 735 (2018). 
 188 See Aya Gruber et al., Penal Welfare and the New Human Trafficking In-
tervention Courts, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2016); GLOB. HEALTH JUSTICE 
P’SHIP, UN-MEETABLE PROMISES: RHETORIC AND REALITY IN NEW YORK CITY’S 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING INTERVENTION COURTS 23, 25 (2018), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/un-
meetable_promises_htic_report_ghjp_2018rev.pdf. 
 189 Melissa Gira Grant, Human Trafficking Courts Are Not a Criminal Justice 
“Innovation,” NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 7, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/arti-
cle/156135/human-trafficking-courts-not-criminal-justice-innovation. 
 190 Gruber et al., supra note 188, at 1366–67. 
 191 Id. at 1364. 
 192 Cf. id. at 1362. 
 193 Cf. id. 
 194 See Zeidman, supra note 145, at 320–21. 
 195 Id. 
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LPP laws.196 Where does that leave those in danger of subjective 
enforcement and wrongful arrest? 
PART III 
Over the last several years, the numbers of LPP arrests across 
New York State have generally decreased.197 Some police precincts 
or departments have chosen non-enforcement and a few prosecutors 
have decided as a matter of policy not to prosecute LPP arrests.198 
Yet, the existence of the statutes themselves remain dangerous and 
problematic. As detailed above in Part II, arrest practice under sec-
tion 240.37 can be revived at any time and for any purpose. The 
increase in arrests in 2018 noted above bears this out.199 
As a new decade dawns, New York finds itself in a particular 
political and historical moment. Broken windows policing, the high-
volume low-level offense policing strategy that dominated over two 
decades, has been declared over,200 disavowed,201 and even the sub-
ject of political apologies.202 Civil rights advocates have fought 
 
 196 Id. 
 197 See Top Arrest Charge, supra note 63. 
 198 See, e.g., Cyrus Vance, Jr. (@ManhattanDA), TWITTER (June 19, 2019, 
7:10 PM), https://twitter.com/ManhattanDA/status/1141483438337351682 (“We 
support vacating convictions for trafficking survivors and repealing the crime of 
‘Loitering for Prostitution,’ which disproportionately impacts LGBTQ New 
Yorkers and does not make us safer. We have not charged this offense for several 
years. #CJreform #WalkingWhileTrans.”); see also Brand & Whitford, supra note 
164. 
 199 See Top Arrest Charge, supra note 63. 
 200 See, e.g., Jacob Gershman, Arrests for Low-Level Crimes Are Plummeting, 
and the Experts Are Flummoxed, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 6, 2019, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/arrests-for-low-level-crimes-are-plummeting-and-
the-experts-are-flummoxed-11570354201?shareTo-
ken=st821b6493f33649b88804c41ce752149d; see also Greg Berman, Why We 
Need to Rethink Misdemeanor Justice, GOVERNING (Mar. 12, 2019), 
https://www.governing.com/gov-institute/voices/col-why-we-need-rethink-mis-
demeanor-justice.html. 
 201 C.J. Ciaramella, George Kelling, Father of ‘Broken Windows’ Policing, 
Dies, REASON (May 17, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://reason.com/2019/05/17/george-
kelling-father-of-broken-windows-policing-dies/. 
 202 See, e.g., Shane Goldmacher, Michael Bloomberg Pushed ‘Stop-and-
Frisk’ Policing. Now He’s Apologizing, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2019), 
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relentlessly to eradicate the NYPD’s unlawful stop-and-frisk prac-
tice and have made significant gains, including a court finding that 
the practice was unconstitutional,203 federal court monitoring,204 and 
a significant decrease in reported stops.205 Although much work re-
mains to undo the harm caused by years of these policing regimes, 
political discourse has unquestionably shifted.206 
Against this backdrop, it is even more perplexing that section 
240.37 is still allowed to threaten women of color and gender non-
conforming individuals in New York City. In this post-broken-win-
dows, post-stop-and-frisk era, LPP laws remain in place and sanc-
tion police abuse in street-based encounters.207 LPP laws codify gen-
der policing in petty offense enforcement and need to be understood 
for what they are—gendered stop-and-frisk. 
Section 240.37 sanctions harmful police encounters that have 
purportedly fallen out of favor.208 More alarming still are recent ef-
forts in other places across the country to enact new LPP laws like 
section 240.37. For example, in June 2018, as the NYPD was mak-




 203 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 625–46 (S.D.N.Y. 
2013). 
 204 See, e.g., Al Baker, Police Evaluations Should Focus on Lawfulness of 
Stops, Monitor Says, N.Y. Times (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/10/20/nyregion/new-york-police-evaluations-stops-moni-
tor.html. 
 205 A 2019 report by the New York Civil Liberties Union establishes that the 
“number of reported NYPD stops has drastically declined since 2011, the height 
of stop-and-frisk in New York City.” N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP-AND-
FRISK IN THE DE BLASIO ERA 2 (2019), https://www.nyclu.org/sites/de-
fault/files/field_documents/20190314_nyclu_stopfrisk_singles.pdf. “In 2017, 
11,629 stops were reported, marking a 98 percent decrease from the number re-
ported in 2011.” Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 See, e.g., ANDREA J. RITCHIE, INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE 
AGAINST BLACK WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR 149 (2017); see also Julia Dahl, 
You Say Loitering for Sex, I Say Just Hanging Out, SALON (Aug. 30, 2010, 3:01 
PM), https://www.salon.com/2010/08/30/prostitution_zone_constitutional/. 
 208 See Brand & Whitford, supra note 164. 
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ordinance outlawing “prostitution-related loitering.”209 The ordi-
nance was passed even though civil rights advocates condemned it 
because it “throws open the door to rampant racial profiling of Black 
women, women of color, queer and trans people, and anyone else 
whose presence in public spaces is presumed to signal an intent to 
trade sex.”210 
Similar patterns emerge everywhere LPP laws are enforced, 
from Phoenix, Arizona,211 to Columbus, Georgia.212 Across the 
country, transgender women, homeless women, and women who 
have previously been arrested for prostitution experience repeated 
arrests.213 Police use LPP laws to arrest women who even turn down 
offers for sex for money and use resources for operations that net 
additional LPP arrests.214 New Jersey’s LPP law mirrors New 
York’s almost to the letter as it criminalizes “wander[ing] . . . in a 
public place with the purpose of engaging in prostitution.”215 There, 
 
 209 CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8-4-016 (2019); see also Jonah Newman & 
Nikki Baim, Prostitution-Loitering Law Likely to Target Women of Color for Ar-
rest, CHI. REP. (July 24, 2018), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/prostitution-loi-
tering-ordinance-likely-to-target-women-of-color-for-arrest/. 
 210 Andrea J. Ritchie & Brit Schulte, “Prostitution-Related” Loitering Ordi-
nance Promotes Racial Profiling in Chicago, TRUTHOUT (July 24, 2018), 
https://truthout.org/articles/anti-prostitution-ordinance-promotes-racial-profil-
ing-in-chicago/ (noting that “[s]imilar laws in California, New York and Wash-
ington, DC, have also long been the subject of controversy and challenges claim-
ing that they facilitate profiling and discriminatory and abusive enforcement.”). 
 211 See, e.g., James Nichols, Monica Jones, Transgender Woman, Convicted 







 212 See, e.g., Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Profiling and Prostitution Pre-Crime in 
Georgia, REASON (August 8, 2017), https://reason.com/2017/08/08/loitering-for-
purpose-of-prostitution/. 
 213 See, e.g., RITCHIE, supra note 207, at 149; see also Dahl, supra note 207. 
 214 See Brown, supra note 212. 
 215 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-1.1 (West 2019). 
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as in New York, “stereotypes are oftentimes the only way to enforce 
such a vague statute.”216 
Elected officials cling to LPP laws as they allow for easy and 
quick ways to clean up public streets in the face of complaints by 
constituents or, more commonly, constituent businesses.217 It is so 
commonly accepted that LPP arrests can be made without probable 
cause that the incoming Milwaukee city prosecutor recently pub-
lished an op-ed explaining how he would utilize Milwaukee’s broad 
LPP statute.218 He distinguished LPP enforcement from that target-
ing actual acts of prostitution or commercial sex, noting that “[a] 
police officer needs a clear indication that a person is offering a sex-
ual act for a thing of value before he/ she can arrest someone for 
prostitution. However, that is not the case with the city ordinance, 
Loitering (Prostitution Related).”219 
Fortunately, in the face of these ongoing and flagrant constitu-
tional abuses, there is now a growing movement organizing against 
abusive LPP laws and their impact on specific communities.220 
Across the country, youth, trans advocates, and sex workers are put-
ting pressure on lawmakers to reexamine LPP laws.221 
A few weeks after the decision dismissing the majority of plain-
tiff’s claims in D.H., two New York legislators introduced a bill that 
would completely repeal section 240.37.222 The bill’s justification 
cited the D.H. plaintiffs’ experience and claims, noting that 
 
 216 Derek J. Demeri, Opinion, Transgender People Are Being Profiled as Sex 
Workers. AG’s Directive Fails to Address the Issue, NJ.COM (Dec. 17, 2019), 
https://www.nj.com/opinion/2019/12/transgender-people-are-being-profiled-as-
sex-workers-ags-directive-fails-to-address-the-issue-opinion.html. 
 217 See Struening, supra note 2, at 19–20. 
 218 See Vince Bobot, Human Trafficking: What Can the City Attorney Do 
About It?, MILWAUKEE COURIER (Jan. 3, 2020), https://milwaukeecouri-
eronline.com/index.php/2020/01/03/human-trafficking-what-can-the-city-attor-
ney-do-about-it/. 
 219 Id. 
 220 See, e.g., Klepper, supra note 35; Alanna Vagianos, Civil Rights Groups 
Call out ‘Archaic’ N.Y. Loitering Law for Targeting Trans People, HUFFPOST 
(June 12, 2019, 10:25 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/civil-rights-groups-
call-out-archaic-ny-loitering-law-for-targeting-trans-peo-
ple_n_5d00067ae4b011df123c0fd1. 
 221 See, e.g., Ritchie & Schulte, supra note 210. 
 222 See State Assemb. A09704A, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018). 
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[a]rrests under Section 240.37 disproportionately im-
pact women, particularly cisgender and transgender 
women of color and women who have previously 
been arrested for prostitution offenses. Eighty-five 
percent of the individuals arrested under Section 
240.37 between 2012-2015 were Black or Latina. In 
particular, women of color have often been unlaw-
fully targeted by officers under this statute during 
“sweeps” or “operations” where officers arrest large 
numbers of women in a given area at the same 
time.223 
In the 2018 session, the bill did not reach a floor vote in either 
chamber, but in 2019 the effort to repeal section 240.37 coalesced 
into a broader movement.224 An advocacy coalition centering the 
people most directly impacted by the law’s enforcement catalyzed a 
groundswell of support.225 The new movement has coined section 
240.37 as the “Walking While Trans Ban,”226 and emphasized that 
its repeal would be “life-saving” for trans communities.227 On No-
vember 20, 2019, the Transgender Day of Remembrance, groups 
rallied to raise awareness of the importance of repealing section 
 
 223 A09704 Memo: New York State Assembly Memorandum in Support of Leg-
islation, N.Y. ST. ASSEMBLY, https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?de-
fault_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A09704&term=2017&Memo=Y (last visited Apr. 8, 
2020). 
 224 In 2018, the Assembly Codes Committee voted favorably on A09704, but 
the bill did not reach a floor vote in the Assembly. See A09704 Committee Votes 
and Floor Votes, N.Y. ST. ASSEMBLY, https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?de-
fault_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A09704&term=2017&Commit-
tee%26nbspVotes=Y&Floor%26nbspVotes=Y (last visited Apr. 8, 2020). The 
State Senate, still Republican-controlled at that time, took no action on the Senate 
version. See S08107 Summary and Actions, N.Y. ST. ASSEMBLY, https://assem-
bly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=S08107&term=2017&Sum-
mary=Y&Actions=Y (last visited Apr. 8, 2020). 
 225 See Klepper, supra note 35 (“More than 100 current and former sex work-
ers rallied at New York’s Capitol on Tuesday to encourage lawmakers to repeal a 
loitering law they say police use to harass people simply for their appearance.”). 
 226 See id. 
 227 See Vagianos, supra note 220. 
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240.37.228 Several transgender women who had been arrested under 
section 240.37 described “near-constant harassment from the NYPD 
based on their appearance as trans women of color.”229 
The repeal campaign’s progress in the 2019 legislative session 
included the public support of two prominent elected District Attor-
neys, Cyrus Vance of New York County and Eric Gonzalez of Kings 
County.230 The New York County District Attorney’s Office had 
ceased prosecuting section 240.37 arrests a year earlier.231 The 
Kings County District Attorney’s Office has likewise demonstrated 
support for eradicating prosecution of LPP cases.232 
The repeal effort also has the backing of major civil rights or-
ganizations, law professors, and grassroots organizations.233 Advo-
cates emphasize how long New Yorkers have suffered discrimina-
tory, and unnecessary, enforcement under section 240.37.234 Alt-
hough it is always difficult to predict how legislatures will act on 
criminal law and policing issues,  momentum is building and organ-
izers are demanding change.235 
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CONCLUSION 
Although the renewed recent challenge to section 240.37 
through litigation was unsuccessful, there are lessons to be gleaned 
from where we have landed over forty years after the law’s passage. 
The vague provisions of the law have proved impervious to consti-
tutional attack precisely because section 240.37 rests on archaic 
norms involving gender and sex.236 Courts countenance sexism, rac-
ism, and classism so naturalized that it passes as objective.237 In this 
way, courts adjudicating criminal cases or hearing constitutional 
challenges fortify harmful entrenched policing rather than act as a 
check on police practices.238 
LPP arrests today look exactly like those of the 1970s, when the 
law was first passed, and like those of the 1990s and early 2000s, at 
the height of broken windows policing.239 Enforcement of the stat-
ute has unfolded exactly as anticipated. Court challenges have failed 
to protect against discrimination and abuse.240 
As part of a larger paradigm shift toward reducing the reach and 
impact of the criminal legal system, an abolitionist approach is nec-
essary when it comes to LPP policing. Abolition does not mean less 
policing, decreased enforcement, or reform in arrest procedure it-
self. Instead, the solution lies in repeal of the law. Taking LPP laws 
like section 240.37 out of the police arsenal would work to eliminate 
policing based on gender, gender-identity, and the enforcement of 
misogynist gender norms. 
Were section 240.37 to be repealed, many questions would re-
main. Without a doubt, there are battles left to fight against the over 
policing of women of color, sex workers, and trans and gender non-
conforming individuals.241 There are myriad other ways gender and 
gender expression are criminalized, particularly in conjunction with 
race and class.242 If section 240.37 did not exist, would the policing 
simply shift elsewhere, utilizing another penal law section? Perhaps. 
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Would police find another tool to control public spaces and sexual 
behavior? It is possible. Yet, that threat alone should not preclude 
rational action now. 
Repealing section 240.37 would unequivocally express that the 
harms caused by its enforcement far outweigh any benefit of its con-
tinued use. Taking the law off the books would show that the expe-
rience of those profiled, harassed, arrested, or criminalized under the 
vague statute is worthy of reparation. Police should no longer be 
empowered to arrest a woman because they claim her cervix was 
showing, nor should a nun’s outfit be the only clothing a woman can 
wear that does not put her at risk of arrest. Repealing section 240.37 
would be a first step in stopping police harassment of women and 
gender non-conforming individuals in public spaces and condemn-
ing what has proven to be gendered stop-and-frisk. 
